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Decided on July 25, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
Matticore Holdings, LLC, Petitioner,
against
Andrew Hawkins & Madeline Cepero AKA Marilyn Cepero,
Respondents.

L & T Index No. 308973/22
Attorney for Petitioner:
Laurence M. Savedoff, P.L.L.C.
3234 White Plains Road
Bronx, New York 10467
(718) 5150020
Attorneys for Respondent Marilyn Cepero:
Stephanie A. Costa, Esq.
Bronx Legal Services
369 East 148th Street, 2nd Floor
Bronx, New York 10455
(718) 9282894
Diane E. Lutwak, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR Rule 2219(A), of the papers considered in the review

of Petitioner's Motion to Vacate "ERAP" Stay and Respondent Cepero's CrossMotion to
Dismiss and/or Other Relief:
Papers
NYSCEF Doc No.
Petition/Notice of Petition (filed 4/7/22) 1, 2
Notice of Petition — Assigned/Court Notice (filed 4/13/22) 3, 4
Affidavits of Service (filed 5/3/22) 5
Petitioner's Notice of Motion 6
Petitioner's Attorney's Affirmation in Support 7
Petitioner's Exhibit A 8
Respondent's Notice of CrossMotion 13
Respondent's Attorney's Affirmation in Support 14
Respondent Cepero's Affidavit in Support 15
Respondent's Exhibits AK 16
Petitioner's Attorney's Reply Affirmation 17
Petitioner's Exhibits AL 1930
Upon the foregoing papers, and for the reasons stated below, Petitioner's Motion to
Vacate ERAP Stay and Respondent Cepero's [FN1] CrossMotion to Dismiss, consolidated
herein for disposition, are decided as follows.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY & FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This holdover eviction proceeding was commenced by Notice of Petition and Petition
dated April 6, 2022, predicated upon a "Ninety Day Notice to Quit" dated October 22, 2021
advising Respondents that Petitioner would commence a summary eviction proceeding if
they did not move out by January 31, 2022. The Petition alleges, inter alia, that the building
is not a multiple dwelling, the apartment is not subject to rent regulation and Respondents
filed an "ERAP" (Emergency Rent Assistance Program) application (Petition at ¶¶ 6, 7, 10).
The Petition was filed with the Court on April 7, 2022 and, by "Court Notice" dated
April 13, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc # 4), calendared for an initial virtual conference in Intake Part
1 on May 4, 2022. The Court Notice further states: "Please attach this to the petition and
notice of petition." The process server's affidavit of service of the Petition, Notice of Petition
and Court Notice, sworn to and filed on May 3, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc #5), asserts service on
Respondent Cepero as follows: "Attempted to serve Madeline Cepero a/k/a Marilyn Cepero
on April 13, 2022, but she refused and told me to do what I had to do, while pointing to the
door. I affixed two copies to the front door. Ms. Cepero waited for until I reached my vehicle
when I saw Ms. Cepero open the front door and remove both copies that were affixed to the
door and rip them up, throwing them in the garbage." Further, the May 3, 2022 affidavit of

service asserts that a copy of the papers was mailed by "registered certified mail" to
Respondent on April 14, 2022. A Supplemental Affidavit of Service, sworn to by the process
server on July 11, 2022 and filed on July 12, 2022 (Exhibit C to Reply Affirmation, NYSCEF
Doc # 21), is identical to his original affidavit with the additional statement that a copy of the
papers was sent to Respondent by "regular mail", also on April 14, 2022.
Both Petitioner by counsel and Respondent pro se appeared for the May 4, 2022 initial
conference. The case was transferred to Part C and adjourned to June 7, 2022. On May 10,
2022 Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to vacate the ERAP stay pursuant to L. 2021, c. 56,
Part BB, Subpart A, §8 as amended by L. 2021, c. 417, Part A, § 4 ("the ERAP Law") and
place the case on the trial calendar. In support of that motion Petitioner makes two
arguments: first, that the stay imposed by the ERAP Law is an unconstitutional violation of
Petitioner's due process rights; second, on the facts and circumstances presented the stay
should be lifted because this is a holdover proceeding against occupants of an apartment in a
building with less than four units, there is no current lease, Petitioner has advised
Respondents that any prior lease will not be renewed and Petitioner does not seek use and
occupancy. Petitioner cites to, inter alia, this Court's decision in 2986 Briggs LLC v Evans
(74 Misc 3d 1224[A], 163 NYS3d 794 [Civ Ct Bx Co 2022]).
Respondent retained counsel who filed opposition to Petitioner's motion and a cross
[*2]motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In opposition to Petitioner's motion
Respondent argues that (1) the constitutional argument cannot be considered because
Petitioner did not serve the New York State Attorney General; (2) even if the constitutional
argument is considered, it should be denied because the ERAP stay is not unconstitutional;
and (3) Respondent is entitled to the benefit of the statutory stay under the ERAP Law.
Respondent's crossmotion, supported by her own affidavit and her attorney's
affirmation, seeks dismissal under CPLR R 3211(a)(8) for lack of personal jurisdiction due to
three defects in the service of the Notice of Petition and Petition: (1) under New York State
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 735(1)(a), because the original
affidavit of service did not assert that a copy was sent by regular mail after a copy was left on
the door; (2) under RPAPL § 735(2)(a), because the affidavit of service was not filed with the
court until May 3, 2022, "significantly more than three days after mailing the court papers on
April 14, 2022"; and (3) under RPAPL § 733(1), which requires that a holdover notice of
petition and petition, "shall be served at least ten and not more than seventeen days before the
time at which the petition is noticed to be heard," as the papers were served more than
seventeen days before the May 4, 2022 return date. Respondent cites, inter alia, Riverside

Syndicate, Inc v Saltzman (49 AD3d 402, 852 NYS2d 840 [1st Dep't 2008]), and Berkeley
Assocs Co v Di Nolfi (122 AD2d 703, 505 NYS2d 630 [1st Dep't 1986]).
In the alternative, Respondent seeks leave to interpose an Answer, and an order deeming
her proposed Answer duly served and filed.
In opposition to the crossmotion Petitioner argues that (1) as per the process server's
Supplemental Affidavit, he did send copies by both registered certified mail and regular mail
on April 14, 2022; (2) the mailings were in addition to personal delivery to Respondent, as
described in the process server's affidavit; (3) failure to file an affidavit of service within
three days of completion of service pursuant to RPAPL § 735(2) is not a jurisdictional defect
but merely a procedural irregularity which can be corrected nunc pro tunc; and (4) service
was not defective under RPAPL § 733(1) because service on "April 1314, 2022" was "at
least ten days before the return date and a mere thirteen business days before the return date."
DISCUSSION
Respondent's crossmotion to dismiss due to defective service will be addressed first, as
if it is granted, there will be no need to address Petitioner's motion to vacate the ERAP stay.
The starting point in the analysis is the "blackletter law" principle that "where the defendant
resists service, it suffices to leave the summons in his general vicinity". McDonald v Ames
Supply Co (22 NY2d 111, 115, 291 NYS2d 328, 331, 238 NE2d 726, 728 [1968]). See also,
e.g., Bossuk v Steinberg (58 NY2d 916, 460 NYS2d 509, 447 NE2d 56 [1983]); Hall v Wong
(119 AD3d 897, 990 NYS2d 579 [2nd Dep't 2014]); Austrian Lance & Stewart, PC v
Rockefeller Ctr, Inc (163 AD2d 125, 558 NYS2d 521 [1st Dep't 1990]). Here, the process
server, in his detailed affidavit, describes Respondent resisting service when he tried to
deliver the papers to her in hand on April 13, 2022. Respondent did not dispute these
allegations in her affidavit, and merely denied receipt of a copy of the papers by regular mail
[FN2]

. A process server's affidavit is prima facie [*3]evidence of proper service sufficient to
withstand a naked denial of receipt of service. Nazarian v Monaco Imps, Ltd (255 AD2d 265,
266, 680 NYS2d 252, 252 [1st Dep't 1998]). It was reasonable and appropriate for the
process server to affix the papers to the door when Respondent, "told me to do what I had to
do, while pointing to the door". That the process server affixed the papers to the door under
these circumstances did not convert the method of service under RPAPL § 735(1) from
"personal delivery" to "conspicuous", rendering the subsequent mailings to Respondent
superfluous and of no legal significance to this case. Accordingly, when he left the papers in
Respondent's general vicinity the process server effectuated service by personal delivery, and

such service was complete "immediately upon such personal delivery". RPAPL § 735(1).
However, the RPAPL imposes other unique service requirements, two of which are
relevant to this proceeding. First, the notice of petition and petition must be served within a
specified time frame: "at least ten and not more than seventeen days before the time at which
the petition is noticed to be heard." RPAPL § 733(1).[FN3] Second, there is a 3day period for
filing proof of service with the Court, which time frame runs either from the date of personal
delivery when service has been made by that means, RPAPL § 735(2)(a), or from the date of
mailing when service is made by an alternative ("conspicuous" or "substituted") method,
RPAPL § 735(2)(b). This statute also establishes when service is deemed complete: for
personal delivery, "immediately", RPAPL § 735(2)(a); when service is effectuated by an
alternative method, "upon the filing of proof service", RPAPL § 735(2)(b).
Here, documents filed on "NYSCEF", the Court's efiling system, reflect the following
• 4/7/22 — Notice of Petition/Petition filed, Court assigns index number
• 4/13/22 — Court assigns return date of 5/4/22 at 11:45 a.m. (virtual appearance)
• 4/13/22 — Court generates "Court Notice", with instructions for Petitioner to
attach it to the Notice of Petition and Petition
• 4/13/22 — Process server effectuates service by personal delivery to Respondent
of the Notice of Petition, Petition and "Court Notice" by leaving the papers in her
"general vicinity" when she refused to accept service
• 5/3/22 — Proof of service (process server's affidavit) filed with the Court
• 5/4/22 — Return date
Applying the rules described above to this timeline, it is evident that when the papers
were personally delivered to Respondent on April 13, 2022 such service exceeded the
maximum 17day advance notice requirement of RPAPL § 733(1) by four days. Further,
having completed service by personal delivery to Respondent on Wednesday, April 13, 2022,
Petitioner was required to file proof of service under RPAPL § 735(2)(a) no later than
Monday, April 18, 2022, see General Construction Law § 25a(1), which allows an act to be
completed on the next business day when it otherwise would have to be completed on a
weekend day or holiday. However, such proof of service was not filed until May 3, 2021.
In the First Department, the leading Appellate Division case analyzing RPAPL §§ 733
and 735(2) is Riverside Syndicate, Inc v Saltzman (49 AD3d 402, 852 NYS2d 840 [1st Dep't

[*4]2008]). The Appellate Term had reinstated holdover petitions dismissed by the trial
court, finding that "In the absence of any discernible prejudice to tenants , landlord's oneday
delay in filing proof of service of the petitions did not require dismissal of these otherwise
properly commenced holdover proceedings." Riverside Syndicate, Inc v Saltzman (15 Misc
3d 138[A], 841 NYS2d 221 [AT 1st Dep't 2007]). The Appellate Division reversed the
Appellate Term and reinstated Housing Court Judge Schreiber's dismissal order as the
landlord had "failed to 'complete' service of the notice of petitions and petitions by filing
proof of service (RPAPL § 735 [2] [b]) at least five days prior to the date the petitions were
noticed to be heard (see RPAPL § 733 [1])." In doing so, the Appellate Division stated, "A
summary proceeding is a special proceeding 'governed entirely by statute and it is well
established that there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements to give the
court jurisdiction." The Appellate Division cited and quoted Berkeley Assocs Co v Di Nolfi
(122 AD2d 703, 505 NYS2d 630 [1st Dep't 1986]), in which that court vacated a judgment
and warrant issued six years earlier and dismissed a holdover petition for lack of both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction for noncompliance with the RPAPL § 733 filing window
period.
Housing Court Judge Ibrahim, recently faced with a similar RPAPL § 733 issue in a
case where proof of service was not filed until five days after the petition's return date,
granted the respondent's motion to dismiss and explained:
While the Appellate Term, Second Department may now take a different view on
this exact issue, this court sits in the First Department and must follow binding
authority. Saltzman is such binding authority. Indeed, it appears to still be binding
authority statewide. See Abakporo v Gardner (22 Misc 3d 1101[A], 875 NYS2d
818 [Civ Ct Kings Co 2008]) ("this court is bound by the precedent set forth by the
First Department in Riverside Syndicate which is the only decision on this issue
which was made by any court of statewide jurisdiction"), citing Mountain View
Coach Lines v Storms (102 AD2d 663, 664, 476 NYS2d 918 [2nd Dep't 1984])
("The doctrine of stare decisis requires trial courts in this department to follow
precedents set by the Appellate Division of another department" until the Court of
Appeals or the same Division announces a contrary rule); see also, D'Alessandro v
Carro (123 AD3d 1, 992 NYS2d 520 [1st Dep't 2014]).
Bronx 2120 Crotona Ave LP v Gonzalez (2022 NY Slip Op 22148, ¶¶ 23, 168 NYS3d 674
[Civ Ct Bx Co 2022]); see also 208 W 20th St LLC v Blanchard (2022 NY Slip Op 22226
[Civ Ct NY Co 2022])(dismissing holdover proceeding under RPAPL § 733(1) as amended
by HSTPA where "conspicuous" service was completed nine days in advance of return date);
Valane v Cruz (2018 NYLJ LEXIS 2629 [Civ Ct Bx Co 2018 (dismissing holdover
proceeding under preHSTPA version of RPAPL § 733(1) where "substituted" service was

completed thirteen days in advance of return date).
This Court acknowledges the difference between the service in this case effectuated by
personal delivery under RPAPL § 735(2)(a) and the "conspicuous" or "substituted" service in
Riverside Syndicate, Berkeley Associates and the other cases cited above, which are subject
to the § 735(2)(b) mandate that service is not complete until proof of service is filed. While
the 3day filing rule applies to all three scenarios, it only implicates personal jurisdiction in
the latter two and not, as here, where the papers were personally delivered and service was
deemed complete under subsection (2)(a) upon such personal delivery.
However, as explained by the Court of Appeals in Brusco v Braun (84 NY2d 674, 682,
621 NYS2d 291, 294, 645 NE2d 724, 727 [1984]), "Article 7 [of the RPAPL] represents the
[*5]Legislature's attempt to balance the rights of landlord and tenants to provide for
expeditious and fair procedures for the determination of disputes involving the possession of
real property [citation omitted]." Following in these footsteps, Riverside Syndicate stands not
just for the proposition that the 3day filing rule as applied under RPAPL § 735(2)(b)
implicates personal jurisdiction; rather, it reaffirms the broader principle that a summary
eviction proceeding "is a special proceeding governed entirely by statute [citations omitted]
and it is well established that there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements
to give the court jurisdiction [citations omitted]." Berkeley Assocs Co v Di Nolfi, supra (122
AD2d at 705, 505 NYS2d at 632). The Appellate Division in Riverside Syndicate rejected the
Appellate Term's focus on "discernible prejudice", instead requiring "strict compliance."
Further, under Section 208.42(i)(1) of the Uniform Rules for the Civil Court of the City
of New York, at the time proof of service is filed a petitioner must also provide the Clerk of
the Court with stamped postcards addressed to each respondent to notify them that a
proceeding has been filed against them. The Court Clerk is then required to mail the
postcards to respondents and "[n]o default judgement for failure to answer shall be entered
unless there has been compliance with this rule." Title 22 NYCRR § 208.42(i)(2). The Court
of Appeals in Brusco v Braun highlighted the fact that these postcards constitute one of three
key opportunities for tenants to receive notice that an eviction proceeding is pending against
them. Here, Petitioner's failure to file proof of service until one day before the proceeding
was noticed to be heard necessarily deprived Respondent of one of those three types of
required notices.
Even if the Court were to find a violation of the 3day filing rule to be excusable here
where the notice of petition and petition were served by personal delivery, as opposed to

"substitute" or "conspicuous" service, Petitioner also failed to meet the requirement under
RPAPL § 733(1) that the papers be served no less than 10 and no more than 17 days in
advance of the return date: they were personally delivered to Respondent on April 13, which
is more than 17 days before the May 4 return date. It bears noting that the New York State
Legislature examined and amended RPAPL § 733(1) as recently as 2019, when HSTPA
changed the window period from a minimum of five days' advance notice to ten. However,
not only was the outer edge of that service window not eliminated or expanded, but HSTPA's
amendment of RPAPL § 733(1) maintains the very same sevenday period for completing
service that has been in place since the 1960's by increasing the maximum advance notice
from 12 to 17 days.
Petitioner's argument that the papers were served "a mere thirteen business days before
the return date" is unavailing. RPAPL § 733(1) does not use the term "business days", that is,
excluding weekends and holidays, and April 13 is 21, not 13, calendar days prior to May 4.
Under New York's General Construction Law § 20, a specified number of days "means such
number of calendar days exclusive of the calendar day from which the reckoning is made";
intervening weekends and public holidays are excluded only when calculating a 2day
deadline, Gen Constr Law § 20, or where the deadline for filing legal papers or other
documents falls on a weekend or holiday when courts or government offices are closed for
business, People v Assi (14 NY3d 335, 343, 902 NYS2d 6, 1011, 928 NE2d 388, 39293
[2010]). Also unavailing is Petitioner's argument that the fact that the Court Clerk provided
the return date somehow affects the calculation of the windowperiod for effectuating
service. The "Court Notice" dated April 13, 2022 calendaring the case for May 4, 2022
(NYSCEF Doc #4) required on its face that Petitioner attach it to the Notice of Petition and
Petition; Petitioner in fact did this and served the "Court Notice" on Respondent with the
Notice of Petition and Petition. See Affidavits of Service, [*6]NYSCEF Doc ## 5 & 21.
Accordingly, as Petitioner failed to strictly comply with the statutory filing and service
requirements under RPAPL §§ 735(2) and 733(1), Respondent is entitled to dismissal of the
Petition, without prejudice. Given this ground for dismissal, there is no need to reach either
party's other arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner's motion is denied,
Respondent's crossmotion is granted, and the Petition is dismissed without prejudice. This
constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court, which the Court is uploading on NYSCEF.

Dated: July 25, 2022
Bronx, New York
Diane E. Lutwak, H. C.J.
Footnotes

Footnote 1 :Respondent Hawkins has not appeared; accordingly, references hereinafter to
"Respondent" are to Marilyn (aka Madeline) Cepero unless otherwise stated.
Footnote 2:Respondent's only statement regarding service was, "Upon information and
belief, I did not receive a copy of the Notice of Petition or Petition in this case by regular
mail." Cepero Affidavit at ~ 13.
Footnote 3:Effective June 14, 2019, under the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act
of 2019, L. 2019, c. 36, § 15 (Part M)("HSTPA"), what used to be "at least five and not more
than twelve days" under RPAPL § 733(1) was changed to "at least ten and not more than
seventeen days."
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